



# Mobile Token-Based Authentication

## On a Budget

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# The future of keys?



## Motivation #1





# Versatility of smartphones



## Motivation #2



# Smartphones vs. keys



\$100

arbitrary apps

use all day

palm-size

fragile

# Smartphones vs. keys



\$100

arbitrary apps

use all day

palm-size

fragile

\$1

unlock doors

a few times daily

tiny

tough





General theme: Unlocking smartphones



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Part I: About this work

- ▶ **Compass as a receiver**
- ▶ **Microphone as a receiver**
- ▶ **Cost and power**



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

Part 2: On-going and future work






# Compass

# Permanent magnets




# Permanent magnets (continued)




Poor resolution:  
distance to magnets is  
too great!

# Magkey prototype






# Magkey circuit




# MagLock app



up to ~5 baud (NI)  
about 1 inch range

# MagLock app







# Microphone




# Mickey prototype




# Mickey circuit



*Magkey, minus the coil, plus:*



# MicLock app



up to ~100 baud (NI)  
about 1 foot range



# MicLock app







# Cost and Power

# Cost



Component	Unit cost	Magkey	Mickey
Timer IC	\$0.20	\$0.20	\$0.40
Shift Register IC	\$0.25	\$0.50	\$0.50
Discrete	<i>varies</i>	\$0.37	\$0.38
Total (Prototype)		\$1.07	\$1.28
<i>PIC IC</i>	<i>\$0.38</i>	<i>\$0.38</i>	<i>\$0.38</i>
<i>Total (PIC)</i>		<i>\$0.75</i>	<i>\$0.76</i>

# Current and longevity



Current	Mode	Magkey	Mickey
Average		6.91mA	0.23mA
Peak		16.00mA	0.25mA
	Continuous	210 hrs	6500 hrs
	On-demand	>5 yrs	>10 yrs



# What's Next?





## Contactless cards (e.g. NFC)

- ▶ No batteries required in token
- ▶ Off-the-shelf tokens: today
- ▶ Short practical range



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## Bluetooth 4.0 (Low-energy)

- ▶ Might be more pervasive than NFC: laptops, PCs
- ▶ Designed for long-term, synchronous operation
- ▶ A decent alternative we might consider

# So, what is next?



## Prove token authentication viability (mobile devices)

- ▶ Analyze more [proprietary] technologies
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## Develop end-to-end token authentication theme

- ▶ Authentication on the web, multi-tenant tokens
- ▶ PC authentication... keychains, PAM, Windows?





# Conclusion



Massive opportunity to redo user authentication:

- ▶ Phones are the most versatile computers to date
  - ★ *Rapid, on-going evolution, diverse inputs*
- ▶ Momentum to standardize light-weight wireless
- ▶ Threats are more abundant than ever before

Address local, mobile app, and web authentication.

Drive the security agenda into standards efforts.



# Time for Q&A.

<http://seclab.stanford.edu>